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Economic Growth is Solid, Just Not as Strong as You Think

May 7, 2019

In July, the current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record and there have been a record 103 consecutive months of uninterrupted job growth.  Not counting the distorting effects of the hiring (and then letting go) of over 411,000 temporary workers on the U.S. Census back in 2009-2010 it would have been 110 consecutive months of job growth.  A similar effect will occur in 2019 and 2020 as the Census Bureau begins hiring temporary Census workers this year and will lay off the workers later in 2020.  You can look forward to a lot of misinterpretation of the job growth numbers in the presidential election year of 2020.

The U.S. economy is strong, but as I argued in my previous post, not as strong as the first estimate of QI GDP growth (3.2%) suggests.  In that post I noted the one-off contributors (inventory builds, lower imports, higher defense spending) to above potential GDP in the first quarter of 2019.  In this post I highlight two employment trends that indicate (to me at least) the U.S. economy is not growing as rapidly as recent reports suggest.

First, growth in aggregate hours worked in the economy is slowing, despite strong gains in job growth.  Aggregate hours worked is a function of both job growth and the number of hours worked each week and the latter has shrunk a bit, offsetting some of the gains in employment.  Aggregate hours worked is related to GDP growth because the more hours worked, the more output the U.S. economy produces.

The growth in aggregate hours worked plus productivity growth is a good surrogate measure of trends in GDP growth. Growth in aggregate hours worked plus growth in productivity (how much each worker produces), at a minimum, will tell you whether GDP growth is accelerating or decelerating.  When the average number of hours worked each week is factored into job growth, April job growth looks much more like 100,000 or less, than 263,000.  This makes sense because productivity growth in the first quarter was initially estimated at 3.4%, a remarkably high rate given that annual productivity growth has averaged about 1% for a decade and the combination of 263,000 job growth and 3.4% productivity growth would imply a very high GDP growth (higher than the 3.2% first quarter growth first reported but which I believe will be revised downward).  Productivity growth is notoriously difficult to calculate and count me skeptical of the 3.4% estimate for the first quarter. Still, the first estimate is the one that gets the headlines and later revisions garner less attention.

The rate of job growth is also slowing, not accelerating, as the initial April job growth estimate implies.  Again, the labor market is strong, there are more job openings than workers available to fill them.  Both of the  survey instruments used to measure employment tell a similar story of job growth that is solid but slowing.  Briefly, the payroll survey is a survey of employers in the country, it provides an estimate of the number of non-farm jobs, the average number of hours worked by employees, and the average hourly wages that they are paid.  The payroll survey does not count the self-employed or those not covered by the unemployment insurance program.  It also counts jobs, not people, so one employed person holding two jobs is counted as two jobs by the survey.  The household survey is used to calculate the unemployment rate and labor force participation.  It provides much more information about the characteristics of the employed and of job growth or job loss in a month than does the payroll (employer) survey.  The household survey counts the self-employed and those not covered by unemployment insurance and it counts an individual working more than one job as a single job for total employment purposes.

The household survey tends to be more volatile, as can be seen in the chart above, but the relevant point is that both surveys show employment growth slowing.  That does not necessarily mean a weaker U.S. economy, but rather than the economy is unable to growth because of labor constraints.  The monthly Job Growth and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) highlights this fact.  Looking at the JOLTS data released today shows that the job openings rate continues to rise much faster than the hiring rate, highlighting the growing gap between labor demand and labor supply.  The chart below shows how the gap between openings and hires has grown in just the Northeast region of the country, where labor shortages are among the most acute.

In conclusion, the U.S. economy is solid and labor markets are strong, just not as strong as recent data points suggest, and at a time when there are more downside than upside risks to the outlook.

Categories: employment, Employment Growth, job growth, U.S. economy, Workforce
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Not So Fast on NH’s Job Growth

March 14, 2019

The monthly payroll employment report gets a lot of attention. The monthly estimates are based on a survey sample of employers (differing from the monthly survey of households that is the source of unemployment and labor force estimates). Prior year monthly payroll estimates are revised early each year as more complete data (than the sample survey) are analyzed.  For a number of reasons (including the fact that newer firms are slow to get included in the survey) NH’s employment estimates more often than not have shown stronger (than first reported) job growth rates. Not this year. The new benchmark numbers have cut the state’s annualized job growth by more than half (to below 1%). The chart below shows the year-over-year growth rate in private sector employment in NH is about 1% (including government employment shows a slightly slower rate of job growth 0.8%).

Benchmark revisions

Early in 2018 I forecast NH’s job growth for 2018 would be about 0.6% (based on labor force constraints – not a weaker economy) and for several months I have been issuing a mea culpa for what looked like a significantly inaccurate employment growth forecast. While my sagacity is less challenged than I originally thought, I was more comfortable with NH’s employment trends when it was.

Categories: Employment Growth, job growth, Labor Force, NH Economy, Uncategorized
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Protectionist Fallacies and Promises

October 11, 2018

Repetez moi: “tariffs are stupid.” Our President, who should know better, said the U.S. has collected billions of dollars from China as a result of the tariffs placed on imported goods. Well no, not exactly, actually not even close. Those billions of dollars have been collected from U.S. companies and manufacturers importing products and materials (like aluminum and steel, electronics, etc.) for use in the products and services that they sell. Tariffs have already cost Ford Motor Co. $1 billion in profit. U.S. consumers are also paying, until recently only on a few products (the CPI for laundry equipment was falling for about 10 years but is up 13% over the past year) but who will soon see prices on more products affected, as tariffs are placed on more products. Auto workers who were promised protectionist policies would spur manufacturing job growth must be disappointed as growth has fallen since 2017 and has been negative since mid-2017. Obviously, there are other influences on emp. growth in autos but protectionism isn’t helping. NAFTA version 2 (which looks a lot like NAFTA version 1) is hailed as the next savior for employment. Why not, those protectionist promises have worked-out so well thus far.

auto manuf emp

Categories: E, Employment Growth, International trade, manufacturing, Uncategorized
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Is NH’s Labor Deficit Turning?

September 19, 2018

Aside from the ups and downs of business cycles, the growth rate of New Hampshire’s (and the nation’s) labor force and labor force participation rate has been on a consistent, downward trend. The rising percentage of NH’s population in age groups with traditionally lower rates of labor force participation along with slower overall population growth are key contributors. The two trends go a long way toward explaining why economic growth has been slower over much of the past two decades than during earlier time periods. As I noted in earlier posts, with NH’s extremely low birth rates, net in-migration to the state is critical for population, labor force, and ultimately employment growth. Net state-to-state in-migration to NH is resuming in age groups with higher labor force participation and one consequence is a recent increase in the working-age population, as well as labor force participation in the state (chart), enabling stronger job growth in NH. It is early but the trend is very encouraging.

Particption and Population

Categories: Demographics, Employment Growth, Labor Force, Labor Force Participation, Uncategorized
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Not With a Bang But With a Whimper

July 26, 2016

The U.S. economy is currently in its 86 month of an economic expansion that began in the summer of 2009 according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the organization that officially dates U.S. business cycles. If the expansion lasts another seven months (as it will), it will be the third longest economic expansion in our nation’s history, trailing only the 120 month expansion from 1991 to 2001 and the 106 month expansion from  1961 to 1969.

The probability of recession in the next six months is low but the business cycle hasn’t been repealed, another recession will occur and almost certainly sometime before the end of 2019.  It’s just that none of the excesses – wage and price growth, high energy prices, inflationary pressures, inflated asset values, etc.- that have preceded past recession are much apparent in today’s economy and there aren’t signs that any are imminent.  What will make the next recession unique in the post WWII era is that it may very well occur before the nation has fully recovered from the previous recession, despite how long the current recovery has lasted.  “Fully recovered” here means that the actual output of the nation’s economy (GDP) reaches its potential output (for a brief explanation of actual and potential output of the economy see this Congressional Budget Office publication). This is somewhat akin to feeling the effects of a hangover in the morning despite not having enjoyed the celebration the night before.  Unlike the last recession, or most recessions, the next one may not begin with a bang but rather with a whimper.

No expansion can last forever; the U.S. and the NH economies are showing signs of slowing so it is difficult for me to believe that the nation can avoid slipping into recession sometime during the first term of our next president.  If that President is named Clinton it will most likely mean a one-term presidency as three consecutive terms for an incumbent party (relatively rare in itself) along with a recession in the third term (unless is happens very early in her term allowing sufficient time for growth prior to 2020) would almost certainly result in the nation looking for a change in the party controlling the White House.  If the President is named Trump he will no doubt blame the recession on the past administration and that may help give him a pass in 2020, but a recession will challenge his claim as someone who knows how to create jobs, while his penchant for populist and nationalistic themes aren’t generally viewed as monetary and fiscal policies effective in combating a recession.  His administration’s and his personal  response to the recession might determine his fate (does anyone else remember the images of the first, single-term, President Bush zooming around in his cigarette boat off the coast of Maine while the U.S. was in the middle of the 1990-91 recession?).

The past two months have been marked by one very bad and one very good month for job growth in the nation and in NH.  I  advocate looking at three months of job growth numbers in discerning employment growth trends and a prudent man would wait for the release of the nation’s July job growth numbers on August 5th before making any proclamations about the direction of the U.S. or NH economy.  But a prudent man doesn’t write this blog and I am comfortable knowing that when you right too early it often seems like you are wrong so here are a few of the more accessible  indicators that I believe suggest slower economic growth moving forward.  There are others but jobs and revenues are what interest policymakers most so they are highlighted here.

  • The rate of private sector job growth has slowed.
  • The number of industries that are adding jobs versus the number shedding jobs (the employment diffusion index) has declined.
  • Help wanted advertising is declining.
  • Nationally, state corporate income tax collections appear to have peaked.

Slowing Private Employment Growth

Recognizing that there is always some level of unemployment in the economy, the nation and NH are at or very near “full employment,” making  job gains harder to obtain.  Full employment in the latter stages of recovery is the most obvious rationale for slower job growth going forward.  As the chart below shows, growth in private sector employment nationally is still solid but has been trending downward for some time while growth in NH accelerated in 2015 but appears to have peaked in early 2016.

private sector job growth

The Breadth of Job Gains Narrows

I use a 13 industry private employment diffusion index to assess the breadth of job growth across the private sector economy.  When more industries are adding jobs than are shedding jobs, the index is below .50 and the greater the number of industries adding jobs compared to those shedding jobs the higher is the index number.  The chart below shows that both the national and NH diffusion index have dropped, with NH’s decline of particular concern as it now stands below .50 on a three month moving average basis. NH’s employment numbers are often substantially revised so this index value may not be as bad as it appears here but the U.S. number still points to a slowdown.

diffusion index

Historically, significant declines in NH’s employment diffusion index have signaled turning points in the state’s labor market. The relationship between NH’s diffusion index value and the rate of year-over-year private sector job growth four months later is strong (a correlation of .82).  A simple linear regression of the NH diffusion index on private sector employment growth suggests the last two quarters of 2016 will see private employment growth in NH of about 0.6% on an annualized basis compared to the current rate of growth of about 2.0%.  Clearly not in danger of recession but definitely a slowdown.

diffusion index and emp growth

Fewer Help Wanted Ads

Nationally and in NH the number of help wanted ads has declined in recent months.  In NH the relationship between the three month moving average of help wanted ads and job growth in the quarter that follows is strong (R= .80).

NH US Help Wanted

Growth in State Corporate Income Tax Collections Has Peaked

Nationally, the rate of growth in state corporate income taxes is declining (chart below).

corporate tax revenues

The chart shows that compared to all states combined, the growth in NH’s business tax revenues is increasing as the growth rate nationally declines.  This despite the fact that NH’s private sector employment growth has been at about the U.S. average over the past year.  What is different in NH is the inclusion of NH’s Business Enterprise Tax revenue along with NH’s tax on corporate profits in the chart above.  Both private employment and wage growth have accelerated in NH over the past year. Wages and salaries paid by a business are the largest portion of the Business Enterprise Tax base so even as business profits grow more slowly, business tax revenues can be buoyed by substantial increases in overall wages and salaries.  While not a measure of the payroll of NH businesses, wage and salary income increased in NH by 8.6 percent between QI 2015 and QI 2016 compared to 5.3 percent nationally.  That increase has helped boost Business Enterprise Tax revenue and overall business tax revenue in NH in a way that it cannot in other states (most other states would see the change in individual income tax revenue).  The trend is depicted in the chart below that shows the growth rate of the annualized business profits portion of NH’s business tax revenue has slipped while the growth rate of the portion more dependent on wages and salaries has seen accelerated growth.  A slowing growth rate in private employment in NH implies slower growth in wages and salaries and business tax revenues in the state growing more similarly to the pattern among states nationally.  This will occur just as a budget surplus and strong overall revenue growth have increased pressures for additional state spending that had been muted by several years of relatively weak business tax and overall revenue growth.

NH business tax revenue growth

It is impossible to predict monthly payroll employment growth for a small state like NH (or any state for that matter) but I predict employment growth of about 120,000 jobs nationally in July but anything between 100,000 and 150,000 would be in line with the indicators highlighted in this post and consistent with a gradual slowing of economic growth nationally and in NH. Not soon but at some point that slowing will become a recession and that will be the reward for winning the White House and for new and incumbent occupants of statehouses across the nation.

Categories: Election, Employment Growth, Help Wanted, NH Economy, Recession, U,S, Economy
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Jobs Just Don’t (and Won’t) Grow Like They Used To

June 29, 2015

A late boss of mine used to say “We all know the time when education in this country started to go downhill; it was the day after each of us graduated.” I am trying to not let nostalgia influence my views of the current labor market and prospects for job and economic and growth. In prior posts I have tried to make the case that slower labor force growth (and to a degree a skills gap) is the fundamental factor constraining growth in the NH economy. In my last post I wrote: “Looking ahead, population and demographic projections show that both nationally and in NH, the working age population (defined here as age 18-64) will show almost no growth over the next 25 years.” If that was written in another’s blog I would have dismissed it if it was not empirically supported, especially if it was as fundamental to the analysis as it was in my post. Regardless of whether you agree with or have even read the analysis in that post, the population and labor force trends it references are keys to understanding critical obstacles to future economic and employment growth.  In this post I provide some documentation and my interpretation of those trends.

It is important to make the distinction between growth in the “working age population” (which my prior post referenced) and “growth in the working age labor force,” (which is a more appropriate measure for the main thesis in that post.). While the two measures  move in the same direction, the magnitude of change can differ as the age composition of the population changes and as  trends in labor force participation among different age and demographic groups change over time. Longer-term trends (as opposed to shorter-term or cyclical trends – those affected by business and economic cycles) in labor force participation can mitigate or exacerbate some of the population trends affecting the size of the labor force.

“Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future”
—Neils Bohr, Nobel Laureate in Physics

First, let’s look at the assertion from my prior post that: “the working-age population …..will show almost no growth over the next 25 years.” That is a remarkably imprecise statement on which to base any analysis and its accuracy depends on your definition of “almost no growth,” as well as how you define the working-age population.  The chart below shows the U.S. Census Bureau’s “middle scenario” for U.S. population growth to the year 2060. In the chart I show four definitions of “working-age population” along with the cumulative growth rate of each. Three of the four definitions begin at age 22 to reflect the adult working age population. The three definitions include: ages 22-64 that recognizes a historical traditional retirement age at 65, as well as two others (ages 22-69 and ages 22-74) that reflect mortality, health, occupational, and retirement trends that have many individuals working beyond traditional retirement ages. To show that adding the younger population has relatively little impact on the trends I include a traditional definition of working-age population that includes individuals ages 16-64.

working age pop growth

The chart shows that the “adult working-age population” is projected to grow by about 10 percent over the next 25 years (between 2015 and 2040) in the first two (more traditional) definitions of working-age and by a much larger 15 percent for the definition that extends “working-age” population to ages 22-74. “Almost no growth” may overstate the decline in the rate of growth but, for me, 10 percent growth over 25 years is pretty close to almost no growth, especially by historical standards. I think the chart highlights the important role that older individuals could play in employment growth in the future. I like to call this the “revenge of the baby boomers” who first entered the labor market in competition with large numbers of other boomers and who experienced resulting demand for their labor that could not always keep up with the big increase in supply. Much later in life boomers who wish to continue working will likely see demand for their labor higher than it has been in the past for older workers.

The Distinction Between Population and Labor Force Growth

How growth in the “working-age” population translates into growth in the labor force is a function of the age composition of the labor force and the labor force participation rates among the different age groups in the population. Participation rates are highest between ages 25 and 54, much lower among teenagers, lower among 22-24 olds and much lower and declining at ages 55 and above. Thus when the population is growing in high participation age groupings (between 25 and 54) labor force growth will grow more similarly to population growth than when more of the growth in population is among younger (under 25) and older (55+ individuals). That is illustrated in the following two charts. The chart below compares cumulative population and labor force growth between 2015 and 2060 in the broadest definition of “working-age population” which here includes ages 16-74. Labor force projections incorporate a forecast of an increase in labor force participation rates for all age groups above age 55 (averaging about a 5% increase in participation rates) consistent with projections of participation made by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The increase in labor force participation among individuals aged 65 and above is not simply a result of individuals who are not able to financially retire (although that does play a role), it is also a function of the better health of older individuals and a decrease in the percentage of jobs in the economy that are physically demanding, among other factors. For age groups in the middle age ranges there is a slight decline in participation rates (averaging about 0.4%), and for the youngest age groups a decline averaging 3.6 percent.

Combining the age distribution of the growth in the working-age population with trends in labor force participation shows that actual labor force growth among the population ages 16-74 is going to be much smaller than population growth because so much of the population growth will be among age groups with the lowest labor force participation rates.

16-74

When a the “adult working-age population” is examined (including ages 22-69), little difference between the cumulative population and labor force growth is seen, with time periods where growth rates are identical and some during which cumulative population growth is slightly higher.. This occurs because the combination of growth in the ages 55-64 population and an increase in the labor force participation rate of this age group compensates for the decline in participation among the youngest age groups and slower population growth in the high participation age groups (25-54).
22-69 growth

Population and Labor Force Growth Over the Next Several Decades Will Support Job Growth That is Less Than One-Half of Current Employment Growth Rates

Each of the graphs above show a labor force that is growing nationally (in fact some states will likely see an outright decline in their labor force). Because the charts show labor force growth it is easy to miss the significance of a slower rate of labor force growth on the U.S. economy and future job growth. Over the past three years the average monthly job growth in the United States has averaged about 200,000 jobs. Real labor force growth hasn’t been sufficient to accommodate that level of growth but because of the layoffs in the labor market during the recession there was enough slack (unemployed individuals and individuals temporarily out of the labor market) in the labor market to allow for that level of job growth. Eventually that slack will be taken-up and job growth will be more constrained because of labor force growth and wages will rise in response to tighter supply (that is just beginning to happen). That was the essence of my thesis about the interaction between NH’s business taxes and demographic and labor market trends.

During the non-recessionary years of the 1990’s the average monthly job growth in the U.S. was about 243,000. Those monthly job growth numbers include jobs going to individuals below the age of 22.  While my analysis primarily is concerned with the adult working-age population (ages 22+), including the labor force ages 16-21 into the analysis changes the population and labor force growth trends very little. Even including individuals ages 16-21 into labor force projections labor force growth will not support an increase in 200,000 plus jobs in the coming decades (except following a recession when substantial layoffs and slack in the labor market exist)..

To illustrate that point the chart below translates the annual increase in the nation’s adult labor force into a potential monthly job growth for the nation (if all of the increase in labor force were employed) under four definitions of the labor force. The chart shows that under a traditional (ages 22-64) or a maximum expansion (ages 16-74) definition of the labor force, annual growth will not sustain current or historical rates of monthly employment growth. During years of the highest labor force growth, jobs would grow only at about one-half the current monthly rate of job growth in the U.S.

LF to job growth conversion

Caveats and Conclusions

Long range forecast and projections are always problematic but the scenario of slower labor force growth and greater competition for labor outlined in this and my previous post will play out even if the degree to which it does has some uncertainty. Despite the overall U.S. trends it is important to note that population and labor force growth will vary greatly among states. Unfortunately NH and other Northeastern states currently are confronting trends that are on the negative end of the spectrum for population and labor force trends.

When the percentage of women in the labor force increased dramatically beginning in the 1970s the labor market was fundamentally changed and the growth potential of the economy was given a tremendous lift. There are no equivalent transformative changes on the labor market horizon. More individuals will work later into their lives but it won’t have the same economic effects as did the increase in labor force participation among half the nation’s population. In addition there has been on ongoing trend of declining labor force participation rates among young people that is, in large part I believe, attributable to the increase in post secondary school enrollments over the past few decades and this partially offsets increases in participation among older individuals. Perceptions of the need for and value of a at four-year college degree are increasingly being challenged so it is possible that the trend of lower labor force participation rates among the young may begin to reverse. The scenario presented here is based on the assumption that current international immigration and state-to-state migration trends will continue unchanged into the future. It is possible that if labor shortages are severe enough in the northeast, we would we see increased net migration into the region, and once again into NH.  But the potential pool of labor which NH can attract will be growing more slowly, making attracting “talent” to the state ever more challenging. That is one reason why I stress the importance of making states and communities attractive to individuals (of all ages) as well as attractive to businesses. Net inter-state migration to NH will likely increase from recent low levels, however, only if the state and its communities offer enough of the amenities and enough of a value proposition to justify that net in-migration. Finally, it is also possible that labor shortages will spur action to increase rates of international immigration to the U.S.. Prediction is indeed very difficult – especially when it is about the future. and especially when it involves a long horizon and as many variables as do population and labor force growth. But for now, my money is on the scenario outlined in this and my previous post.

Categories: Employment Growth, Labor Force, Labor Force Participation, NH Economy, Population Growth
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